Simulations are performed in order to make comparisons among five methods of U.S. Congressional apportionment. Specifically, the probability is estimated under each method of apportionment that the number of Representatives allocated to a state is equal to the number obtained by rounding off the quota of that state to the nearest integer. According to the Webster method, numerical evidence shows that the probability is 97.6 percent on average.
Introduction
The U.S. Constitution requires that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State" (see U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 2, Amend. 14, Sec. 2). Because each state must be represented by a whole number of Representatives, it is almost impossible to carry out the requirement exactly. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court (in the case of United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442(1992)) admits this fact. The issue of apportioning Representatives among the several states constitutionally has been debated for over 200 years.
Mathematically speaking, let s denote the number of states, h the total number of seats to be apportioned or the house size, p = (p 1 , . . . , p s ) the population of the s states where p i is a positive integer for each i. In the theoretically perfect apportionment, the proportional share, namely, the quota of state i is q i = hp i /p * where p * is the total population of the country, i.e., p * = ∑ j p j . Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a s ) ≥ 0 be a vector of non-negative integers, then the vector a is called an apportionment of h if ∑ i a i = h. Then, carrying out the constitutional requirement exactly means to achieve the mathematical equality a = q where q = (q 1 , . . . , q s ) is the vector of quotas. Undoubtedly it is virtually impossible.
One of the most natural methods of apportioning Representatives among the states might be rounding off the quotas in the usual way. Mathematically, this implies that a i must be [q i ] 0.5 for all i's and the equality ∑ i a i = h must be achieved, where [z] 0.5 is an integer obtained by rounding off z in the usual way, namely, [z] 0.5 is the nearest whole number to z. If the fractional part of z is exactly 0.5, then [z] 0.5 can be either of two consecutive integers z − 0.5 and z + 0.5.
On the other hand, the probability that such a rounding-off method can produce an apportionment of just h would be very low. Generally, such a roundingoff method would produce an apportionment of another house size h ′ ̸ = h. Conversely speaking, a method producing an apportionment of just h does not generally give an apportionment satisfying a i = [q i ] 0.5 for all i's. Nevertheless, it can be much expected that any reasonable method producing an apportionment of just h will give an apportionment satisfying
The purpose of this article is to identify a method of apportionment which can produce an apportionment of h satisfying a i = [q i ] 0.5 for as many states i's as possible because such a method of apportionment seems to be most natural.
The Hamilton method and the Alabama paradox
Because the constitutional requirement that the number of Representatives to which each state is entitled shall be proportional to the population of that state cannot be met completely, it might be reasonable to seek an apportionment a which is as close to the vector of quotas q = (q 1 , . . . , q s ) as practicable.
In fact, the method given by the first apportionment bill passed by Congress in 1792 minimizes the distance between these two vectors a and q, i.e., ∥a − q∥, or minimizes
where N denotes the set of non-negative integers and "s.t." is an abbreviation for "subject to." At that time, the values of s = 15 and h = 120 were used. Although this bill was vetoed by President Washington, the apportionment is appealing because exactly the same apportionment results if the quotas are rounded off in the usual way, see Table 1 . If an apportionment method satisfies such a property, then it will be said that the method satisfies the "rounding-off constraints." If not, it will be said that it violates the rounding-off constraints. It is clear that rounding off quotas in the usual way does not always yield an apportionment of h. For example, let there be three states (s = 3) whose populations are p 1 = 235, p 2 = 333 and p 3 = 432. When the total number of representatives is h = 10, the quotas of the three states are q 1 = 2.35, q 2 = 3.33 and q 3 = 4.32. Rounding off the quotas in the usual way yields a vector a = (2, 3, 4) which is an apportionment of only nine representatives. That is, one representative is surplus. If the total number of representatives increases by one, i.e., h = 11, then the quotas of the three states change into q 1 = 2.585, q 2 = 3.663 and q 3 = 4.752. Rounding them off as before gives another vector a = (3, 4, 5) . This time, an apportionment of as many as twelve representatives results and one representative is short because there are no more than eleven representatives.
In order to overcome this difficulty, Alexander Hamilton invented an apportionment method and several decades later Samuel Vinton reinvented it which is today referred to as the "Hamilton method" or the "method of greatest remainders." In fact, the Hamilton method yields the same seat distribution to 15 states as that of the first apportionment bill passed by Congress in 1792. Although, as said above, this method produces an apportionment which minimizes
2 subject to the constraints given above, another explanation for this method is more familiar: Each state i receives the number of Representatives corresponding to the whole number of the quota q i , that is, the number obtained by ignoring the fractional remainders. The remaining Representatives are distributed to the states with the largest fractional remainders.
Unfortunately, the Hamilton method is subject to the so-called "Alabama paradox." The first numerical example gives an apportionment a = (3, 3, 4) of ten Representatives under the Hamilton method while the second one an apportionment a = (2, 4, 5) of eleven Representatives. Then, the first state gets three Representatives when the house size is h = 10, while it gets only two Representatives when the house size increases by one, i.e., h = 11. This peculiar phenomenon is known as the Alabama paradox because this phenomenon occurred in the State of Alabama. Although the Hamilton method had been used under the censuses of 1850 through 1900, Congress rejected it in 1911 because of this paradox.
Methods of apportionment
After the Hamilton method was rejected, Congress returned to the Webster method which had been used after the 1840 census. After debating over the proper method of apportionment for several decades, Congress adopted the Hill method in 1941 and it has been used ever since then. The methods of Webster and Hill come under socalled "divisor methods" which can avoid the Alabama paradox, see [1] for the details of other paradoxes. Therefore, the scope of the debate over the proper method of apportionment may be reduced mainly to the methods of Webster and Hill. In what follows, divisor methods are described shortly.
Divisor methods
Define 
Although there can be innumerable divisor methods, the following methods are known as the "five historical methods" and have received special treatment for a long time:
• 
Relaxedly proportional methods
In the history of U.S. apportionment, the Jefferson method was used after each of the first four censuses and was abandoned by Congress because it tends to favor large states over small states. The Adams method was considered by Congress but it was not adopted because it tends to favor small states over large states in contrast to the Jefferson method. The Dean method has never be used by Congress in the history of apportionment. Recently, this author has developed a class of "relaxedly proportional" methods, see [2] for the details. He explains why these three methods, i.e., the methods of Adams, Dean and Jefferson, produce apportionments which are not proportional to the population of states in some sense. Now consider the following minimization problem:
a i = h and a i ∈ N for all i's.
Let W denote the set of all optimal solutions a = (a 1 , . . . , a s ), then it is well known that W defines the Webster method, see [1] . In other words, any apportionment of h produced by the Webster method minimizes
∑ i a i = h and a i ∈ N for all i's, while any optimal solution a = (a 1 , . . . , a s ) to the minimization problem above is an apportionment of h under the Webster method. Here it should be noticed that the Webster method which is a divisor method can be also defined as a discrete optimization problem.
Next consider its continuous relaxation minimizing
where R + denotes the set of positive real numbers. Then it is clear that there can exist some positive λ > 0 such that (a
s at optimality, which means that a i is proportional to p i for all i's at optimality. In other words, a i = (λ/2)p i = (h/p)p i = q i at optimality. Then, the Webster method is said to be relaxedly proportional. In general, if an apportionment method can be described in the form of discrete optimization and its continuous relaxation has an optimal solution identical to the vector of quotas, i.e., a = q, then the method is relaxedly proportional.
Similarly, the Hill method is obtained by minimizing
where N + denotes the set of positive integers. This author proposed to use the following three relaxedly proportional methods instead of the methods of Adams, Dean and Jefferson which were shown not to be relaxedly proportional, see [2] :
• the Theil-Schrage (T&S for short) method with d(0) = 0 and d(a) = 1/ log((a + 1)/a) for all integers a ≥ 1, which is obtained by maximizing
a i = h and a i ∈ N + for all i's.
• The Theil method with d(0) = 1/e ≈ 0.37 and d(a) = (1/e)(a + 1) a+1 /a a for all integers a ≥ 1, which is obtained by minimizing
• The "1/3" method with d(a) = √ a 2 + a + 1/3 for all integers a ≥ 0, which is obtained by minimizing
The "new five" are defined to be the methods of Hill, T&S, Theil, Webster and "1/3." They are not only divisor methods but also relaxedly proportional. See [3, 4] for the ancestors of the methods of Theil and T&S.
Violating the rounding-off constraints
The purpose of this section is to study on average how many out of the s states violate their rounding-off constraints, i.e., |a i − q i | ≤ 0.5, under apportionments of h produced according to the new five methods.
First, according to the 2000 census fix an apportionment of the 435 Representatives among the 50 states produced by each of the new five methods. Note here that the Hill method produces the existing apportionment according to the 2000 census.
Let method M define an apportionment a = a(M ) and a divisor x = x(a(M )). Let random P i be uniformly distributed on the interval
then the apportionment method M gives the same apportionment a(M ) for the population P 1 , . . . , P s as for the actual population according to the 2000 census.
To avoid the unrealistic assumption of very small states, assume in estimating the total number of states violating the rounding-off constrains that no state's quotient is less than 0.5. In other words, the random population of each state is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval
One million instances are generated for each of the new five methods. Then the average number of states out of the 50 states which violate the rounding-off constrains is estimated for each method. In addition, the same simulation is run for each of the 1990 through 1960 censuses, see Table 2 .
The results of these simulations show that the average number of states whose numbers of Representatives are a i = [q i ] 0.5 under the Webster method is about 48.8, Table 3 . For easy comparison with Table 2 , each entry on the last line shows the value of the respective entry on the second last line multiplied by 50/48. Here appear the numbers similar to those in Table 2 .
The U.S. Constitution also requires that "each State shall have at least one Representative" (see U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 2). Since this requirement favors extremely small states, it might be better to modify the quota q i = hp i /p * of each state i or to change it intõ
In other words, the quotas of all states are reduced proportionally but never reduced to less than one. If the quota q i is replaced by the modified oneq i for each state i, then the rounding-off constraint |a i − q i | ≤ 0.5 should be replaced by the modified rounding-off constraint, i.e., |a i −q i | ≤ 0.5.
Simulations are performed according to this modification. Tables 4 and 5 present the simulation results. They show that expected numbers of states violating the constraints under the methods of Hill, T&S and Theil decrease slightly and those under the methods of Webster and "1/3" increase almost as much. Therefore the difference between the methods of Hill and Webster shrinks a little.
Conclusions
Generally admitted, the debate over the proper method of apportionment narrows down to which is better, Webster's or Hill's method. Using the numerical results of Table 2 , the probability that one state satisfies its rounding-off constraint under the method of Webster is about 97.58% while that under the method of Hill is about 95.73%. The Webster method wins by only 1.85 points.
In this article, the rounding-off constraints are proposed to identify which method is superior to the others. Although this identification is limited to the new five methods (the methods of Hill, T&S, Theil, Webster and "1/3"), they include the leading two methods, namely, Webster' and Hill's methods, and satisfy the most telling properties in the apportionment problem, see [2, 5] , and hence the limitation seems to be reasonable.
In the end, the Webster method turned out to produce almost the same apportionment as that obtained by rounding off all the quotas of the states in the usual way. This is one of the most important properties which a proper apportionment method should have. From this standpoint we can say that the Webster method is better than any other method discussed in this article.
